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Abstract: 
Paul  Ricœur  and  Jacques  Derrida  agree  that  translation  is  a  tensive  activity  oscillating  between  the  possible  
and  the  impossible  with  reference  to  the  transposition  of  meaning  among  diverse  systems  of  discourse.  Both  
acknowledge  that  risk,  alterity,  and  plurality  accompany  every  attempt  at  paraphrasing  language  “in  other  
words.”   Consequently,   their   positions   adhere   to   the   traditional   adage   that   “the   translator   is   a   traitor,”  
precisely   because   something   is   always   lost   in   the   semantic   transfer.   Yet,   Derrida   notes   an   important  
disagreement   between   their   respective   approaches   to   translation   and   accuses   Ricœur   of   harboring   a  
nostalgia   for   unitive   meaning   and   of   promoting   the   possibility   of   a   transcendental   signified   that   could  
produce   a   “pure”   translation.   In   this   essay,   I   critique   Derrida’s   interpretation   of   Ricœur   specifically   by  
examining  their  individual  interpretations  of  the  Tower  of  Babel  myth.  I  argue  that  Ricœur’s  theory  of  Babel  
as  a  non-­‐‑punitive  celebration  of  diversity  and  the  open  play  of  meaning  “out-­‐‑deconstructs”  Derrida’s  own  
notion  of  dissemination.    
Keywords:  Babel,  Deconstruction,  Translation,  Polysemy,  Hospitality.  
Résumé: 
Paul   Ricœur   et   Jacques   Derrida   s’accordent   à   considérer   la   traduction   comme   une   activité   tensionnelle  
oscillant   entre   le  possible   et   l’impossible  dans   sa   tâche  de   transposition  du   sens   entre  divers   systèmes  de  
discours.   Tous   deux   reconnaissent   que   le   risque,   l’altérité   et   la   pluralité   accompagnent   chaque   tentative  
pour   paraphraser   le   langage   “dans   d’autres   mots.”   C’est   pourquoi   leurs   positions   souscrivent   à   l’adage  
traditionnel   selon   lequel   “le   traducteur   est   un   traitre,”   précisément   parce   que   quelque   chose   est   toujours  
perdu   dans   le   transfert   sémantique.   Derrida   souligne   cependant   un   important   désaccord   entre   leurs  
conceptions   respectives   de   la   traduction   dans   la  mesure   où   il   accuse  Ricœur   d’entretenir   une   nostalgie   à  
l’égard  d’un  sens  unitaire  et  de  défendre  la  possiblité  d’un  signifié  transcendantal  susceptible  de  produire  
une   “pure“   traduction.   Dans   cet   essai,   je   critique   l’interprétation   derridienne   de   Ricœur   en   examinant  
spécialement   les   interprétations   personnelles   que   les   deux   philosophes   donnent   du  mythe   de   la   Tour   de  
Babel.  Je  défends  la  thèse  selon  laquelle  la  conception  ricœurienne  de  Babel  comme  célébration  non-­‐‑punitive  
de   la   diversité   et   du   jeu   ouvert   du   sens   déconstruit   de   l’extérieur   la   notion   de   dissémination   propre   à  
Derrida.  
  Mots-­‐‑clés:  Babel,  déconstruction,  traduction,  polysémie,  hospitalité.  
    
Études  Ricœuriennes  /  Ricœur  Studies          
Vol  6,  No  1  (2015)        ISSN  2155-­‐‑1162  (online)        DOI  10.5195/errs.2015.283        http://ricoeur.pitt.edu        
Traduire  C’est  Trahir  –  Peut-­‐‑être  
Ricœur and Derrida on the (In)Fidelity of Translation 
B.  Keith  Putt  
Samford University 
“The   translator   is   a   traitor…  perhaps.”  That   is   how  one  may   translate   this   essay’s   title  
into  English.  Of  course,   the  traditional  phrase  that   lies  behind  this  title  excludes  the  addition  of  
the   “peut-­‐‑être,”   an   addition   that   reduces   the   indictment   of   discursive   treason   brought   against  
anyone  so  bold  as  to  claim  the  capability  of  adequately  transferring  meaning  from  one  language  
to  another.  Since  a  certain  incommensurability  obtains  among  the  various  linguistic  systems,  an  
absolutely   precise   transposition   of  meaning  without   remainder   appears   to   be   an   impossibility.  
One  must   translate   inter-­‐‑lingually,   then,   always   risking   the   inevitability   of   omission.   In   other  
words   –   a  phrase   that   interestingly   enough  denotes   intra-­‐‑lingual   translation   –   one  may  perhaps  
translate  a  text.  One  can  never  be  certain  as  to  whether  an  adequate  translation  has  been  achieved  
or  whether  one  may  need  to  re-­‐‑translate  in  order,  perhaps,  to  create  a  more  rigorous  repetition  of  
the  original  meaning.1  This  recognition  of  omission  grounds  the  potentiality  of  betrayal  noted  in  
the  titular  saying.  The  translator  is  a  traitor  primarily  because  one  can  never  be  exclusively  loyal  
to  the  original   language.  How  loyal  one  remains   is  ambiguous;  consequently,  one  may  perhaps  
betray  an  original  text  or  perhaps  not.  One  may  be  more  or  less  faithful  in  translating  meaning,  
which   means   that   a   trustworthy   translation   is   always   contaminated   with   a   functional  
paraphrastic  “perhaps.”  
Given   a   certain   reading   of   Paul   Ricœur’s   and   Jacques   Derrida’s   philosophies   of  
translation,  one  may  well  add  the  palliative  “perhaps”  to  the  saying  in  order  to  do  justice  to  the  
reality   of   the   systemic   ambiguity   and   the   tensive   reciprocity   that   obtain   within   their   various  
paralogies   of   translating   the   untranslatable.   Both   theorists   insist   that   the   inevitability   of  
translation  never  escapes  the  impossibility  of  realizing  a  loyal  rendering  of  the  original.  Ricœur’s  
notion   of   “plurivocity”   and   Derrida’s   non-­‐‑conceptual   concept   of   “différance”   express   that  
meaning   remains   in   flux,   always   caught   in   a   semantic   kinesis   that   never   reaches   the   stasis   of   a  
decidedly  specific   inter-­‐‑lingual  “transference-­‐‑without-­‐‑remainder.”  Furthermore,  both  also  agree  
that   univocal   meaning   can   never   characterize   any   singular   language,   that   is   to   say,   that   even  
intra-­‐‑lingual   translation   fails   to   achieve   the   transparency   of   a   linguistic   homogeneity.   In   other  
words,  in  their  differing  ways,  both  philosophers  argue  for  a  compulsory  paradox  of  paraphrase.  
Although  agreeing  at  several  points  about  the  complexity  of  translation,  about  how  one  
can  never  ignore  the  diversity  of  discourses,  and  about  the  disconnection  within  the  diversity  that  
preempts  an  absolute  attestation  of  semantic  clarity,  Ricœur  and  Derrida  do,  nevertheless,  differ  
in   their   evaluations   of   the   untranslatability   of   translation.   One   such   difference,   which   will  
function  as   the   focus  of   this   essay,   concerns   their  various   interpretations  of   the  positive  and/or  
negative   context   within   which   linguistic   heterogeneity   demands   constant   translation.   These  
various   interpretations   actually   converge   at   the   point   of   their   disparate   readings   of   the  
provocative   Tower   of   Babel   narrative   in   Genesis,   the   narrative   that   attempts   to   explain   the  
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dissemination  and  confusion  of  human   languages  and,  consequently,   that  serves  as  an  etiology  
for  the  necessity  of  translation.  
Surprisingly,  Derrida  appears  to  be  quite  comfortable  with  a  more  traditional  perspective  
on   the   etiological   tale,   one   taken  by  Walter  Benjamin,   for   example,  whose   essay  on   translation  
figures   so   significantly   in  Derrida’s   reading.  Without   too  much  overt   criticism,  Derrida   adopts  
the  usual   idiom  of  divine  condemnation  and  concludes  that   the  necessity   for   translation  results  
from   a   punitive   act   of   God’s   judgment.   Linguistic   multiplicity   ensues   from   the   giving   of   the  
divine  name,  which,  in  turn,  disrupts  the  purity  of  a  single  mode  of  communication.  Translation,  
therefore,   transpires   because   of   the   “trespass   of   the   sign,”2   something   of   a   postlapsarian   social  
and  linguistic  distanciation  that  expresses  God’s  chastisement  of  humanity.  Whereas  the  plurality  
of   languages   may   be   considered   a   positive   expression   of   a   beneficial   heterology,   it   remains,  
nonetheless,   a   divine   response   to   the   culpability   of   disobedience,   although,   again,   one   might  
qualify  it  as  a  felix  culpa,  a  happy  guilt.  
Ricœur,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  consider  the  Babel  story  to  be  a  retaliatory  text  but  
another  indication  of  the  creative  differentiation  that  should  not  be  understood  as  a  postlapsarian  
loss   of   discursive   purity.   On   the   contrary,   for   him,   God’s   “confusion”   of   languages   into   a  
multiplicity   of   expressions   should   be   interpreted   as   a   principle   of   plenitude   that   exempts  
plurivocity  and  polysemy  from  any  need  for  redemption.  For  Ricœur,  therefore,  the  felix  culpa  is  
an  inappropriate  characterization  and  should  be  replaced  with   felix  sine  culpa.  There  is  no  culpa!  
He  insists  that  alterity  does  not  come  as  a  loss  of  an  original  homogeneity;  it  is  itself  an  originary  
affirmation  of  the  extravagance  of  plurality.  Indeed,  he  argues  that  translation  signifies  the  reality  
of  “linguistic  hospitality,”  the  possibility  of  engaging  the  other  as  other  through  an  appreciation  
of   diversified  discourses.  Although  Derrida   indicts  Ricœur   as   an   adherent   to   the   false   hope   of  
univocal   meaning   and   truth   through   his   putative   acceptance   of   the   possibility   of   equivalent  
translations,   I   argue   that   just   the  opposite   is   true   –   that  Ricœur  may  be  more   “deconstructive”  
than   Derrida   in   his   primary   affirmation   of   the   risk   of   semantic   non-­‐‑closure   that   consistently  
haunts  translation.  
Translation  as  Transgression  
One  can  initiate  a  reading  of  Derrida’s  philosophy  of  translation  by  examining  a  pair  of  
paradoxes  that  identify  a  basic  economy  of  the  “impossible  possibility”  systemically  inscribed  in  
all   language.  Derrida   claims,  with  his  usual  deconstructive  playfulness,   that   an   individual  only  
speaks   one   language   while   simultaneously   never   speaking   only   one   language.3   This   “law”   of  
translation,   as   he   calls   it,   indicates   that   every   monolingualism   displays   symptoms   of   the  
contamination   of   linguistic   polymorphism,   both   in   the   sense   that   every   linguistic   vocabulary  
contains   the   remnants  of  various   foreign  semiotics  and  also   in   the   sense   that,  within   the  ersatz  
homogeneity  of  a  specific  language,  one  inevitably  discovers  hetero-­‐‑lingual  aspects  that  demand  
the   infinite  play  of   hermeneutics.4   The  paralogy  of  mono-­‐‑poly-­‐‑lingualism   leads   logically   to   the  
second   apparently   illogical   polarity:   specifically,   that   nothing   is   genuinely   untranslatable,  
although  everything   is  untranslatable.5  Derrida  confesses   that  he  has  no   trouble  maintaining   the  
tension  between  universal  translatability  and  universal  untranslatability,  given  that  every  text  not  
only  allows  but  demands  the  iteration  of  re-­‐‑expression,  whether  by  translation  or  interpretation,  
while  concurrently  prohibiting  any  transparent  or  precisely  equivalent  countersignature.6  Texts,  
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too,  never  communicate   in  only  one   language;  however,   languages  with  proper  names,   foreign  
phrases,   or   poetic   idioms   make   speaking   a   second   language   and,   a   fortiori,   translating   that  
language   extremely   difficult,   if   not   impossible.7   He   insists   that   this   implicit   impossibility   of   a  
“pure”   translation   should   not   be   shocking   to   anyone,   since   were   we   genuinely   honest   with  
ourselves   and   others,   we   would   confirm   that   “any   given   translation,   whether   the   best   or   the  
worst,   actually   stands   between   the   two,   between   absolute   relevance,   the   most   appropriate,  
adequate,  univocal  transparency,  and  the  most  aberrant  and  opaque  irrelevance.”8  
Derrida   goes   on   to   address   explicitly   the   pervasive   predisposition   to   minimize   the  
paradoxical  uncertainty  associated  with  translation,  claiming  that  such  a  predisposition  actually  
discloses  the  ontotheological,  logocentric  prejudices  that  have  long  plagued  western  metaphysics.  
The   desire   for   a   “pure”   translation   that   exhaustively   re-­‐‑inscribes   an   original   text   into   an  
equivalent   “repetition”   conspicuously   reveals   the   desire   for   a   transcendental   signified,   for   a  
univocity   of   meaning,   and   for   the   “theological”   aspiration   of   totalization.9   He   illustrates   this  
“theology  of  translation”  with  Schelling’s  conjecture  that  all  knowledge  begins  from  an  “originary  
unity,”  which  he  associates  with  the  “Urwissen  of  God,”  that   is,   the  foundationalism  of  absolute  
knowledge.10   Derrida,   therefore,   rejects   the   most   “relevant   translation”   –   conventionally  
considered   to  be   “the   transfer  of   an   intact   signified   through   the   inconsequential   vehicle  of   any  
signifier   whatsoever”   –   as   the   least   relevant   possible,   since   it   is,   to   be   sure,   an   impossible  
expression  of  an  assumed  originary  meaning.11  
Of   course,   Derrida   has   consistently   recognized   that   the   erotic   drive   for   the   purity   of  
language   and   the   closure   of   certainty   accounts   for   what   he   calls   the   “very   passage   into  
philosophy”   –   a   passage   that   for   him   ensues   directly   from   a   significant   exemplar   of   how   the  
profusion   of   meaning   makes   translation   problematic.   For   example,   Derrida   extensively  
investigates  how  exactly  one  might   translate   the  Platonic   concept  of  “pharmakon,”   that  decisive  
term   that   Socrates   uses   to   dismiss   textuality   as   an   impure   surrogate   of   orality.   The  word  may  
contrarily   mean   “poison”   or   “remedy,”   a   negative   or   a   positive,   something   to   be   avoided   or  
something   to   be   desired.12   Such   an   enigma   of   translation  most   noticeably  marks   the   threshold  
into  philosophy,  because  philosophy,  as  the  “thesis  of  translatability,”  has  not  been  preoccupied  
with   translation   as   a   hermeneutical   issue   struggling  with   the   ambiguities   of   interpretation   but  
actually  with   translation   as   the   transference   of   univocal  meaning   or   the   hegemonic   control   of  
“plurivocality.”13   Yet,   such   a   desire   for   an   intact   “kernel”   of   meaning,   of   a   signified   that   can  
transcend  all  signifiers  without  remainder,  is  precisely  what  deconstruction  constantly  calls  into  
question  with  its  emphases  on  textuality  and  différance  and  what  Derrida  yearns  to  disrupt  with  
his   perplexing   paradoxes   of   translation.14   As   a   matter   of   fact,   he   designates   a   consistent  
incredulity  toward  the  “motif  of  ‘purity’”  as  the  “first  impulse”  of  deconstruction.15  
Derrida  contends  that  all  of  the  pertinent  issues  relating  to  the  two  legislating  paradoxes  
of  translation  coalesce  in  the  provocative  narrative  of  the  Tower  of  Babel  in  Genesis  11.  He  refers  
to  this  text  as  an  “epigraph  for  all  discussions  of  translation,”  since  it  inculcates  the  topics  of  pure  
language,  theology  of  translation,  the  reality  of  non-­‐‑totalization,  and  the  possibility  of  translation  
as   a   linguistic   soteriology.16   The  myth   also   establishes   the   ambiguity   that   exists   not   only   inter-­‐‑
lingually  but   also   intra-­‐‑lingually,   thereby  establishing   the  ubiquity  of   the  “Babelian  motif,”   the  
inescapable  impurity  of  semantic  imprecision,  and  the  inexorable  necessity  for  the  untranslatable  
translation   of   the   poetic.  He   acknowledges   that   the   Babelian  motif   insinuates   a   difference   that  
operates   within   the   structures   of   a   single   discourse   without   the   necessity   to   engage   another  
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foreign   language.  The  plurivocity  of  meanings   inherent  within  any   linguistic  system  “separates  
translation   from   itself   [and]   separates   translatability   within   one   and   the   same   language.”   He  
refers  to  this  plurivocity  as  the  product  of  a  hereditary  hospitality  that  every  language  has  for  the  
differences   that   reside  within   itself.17   In  other  words,  Derrida   connects   the  Babelian  motif  with  
the  potentiality   indigenous   to   every   language   that   allows   for   an   iteration   of   any   statement   “in  
other   words”   (en   d’autres   mots)   the   indexical   phrase   noted   above   as   a   signal   of   intra-­‐‑lingual  
translation.18  Moreover,  within  a  single  discourse,  the  Babelian  motif  attempts  to  account  for  the  
necessity  of  figuration  and  tropes  as  semantic  generators  of  new  meaning.  Consequently,  it  serves  
as   “the  myth   of   the   origin   of  myth,   the  metaphor   of  metaphor,   the   narrative   of   narrative,   the  
translation  of   translation.”19  As  a   result,   the  Babelian  motif   addresses  both   the   inter-­‐‑   and   intra-­‐‑
lingual  impossible  possibility  of  translation,  as  well  as  the  deconstructive  dynamic  at  work  in  any  
pretense   to   complete   or   finalize   a   formal   structure   or   coherent   construct,   whether   linguistic,  
cultural,  theological,  or  philosophical.20  
What  is  most  fascinating  for  Derrida  about  this  etiology  of  linguistic  multiplicity  is  how  it  
connects   the   confusion   of   language   with   the   divine   punishment   of   the   Shemites   (the   people  
whose  name  (shem)  means  “name”  or  “lip”  in  Hebrew),  thereby  identifying  the  confusion  as  an  
overtly   punitive   act   perpetrated   against   a   sinful   humanity   by   a   jealous   and   wrathful   deity.21  
Derrida   emphasizes   that,   ironically,   the   linguistic   “confusion”   that   results   from   the   divine  
sanctions  actually  ensues  from  God’s  judgment  meted  out  as  a  gift;  that  is  to  say,  God  expresses  
God’s  holy  wrath  by  giving   the  people   a  donation,   specifically   endowing   them  with   the  divine  
name,  by  pronouncing  over   them   the  name  of  God  as  “father”—Babel  as  ba-­‐‑bel,   as   in  abba-­‐‑baal,  
“father  God.”22  Of  course,  Derrida  indicates  that  the  biblical  text  “translates”  the  gift  of  the  divine  
name,  “Babel,”  not  as  “father  God,”  but  as  “confusion.”  Doing  so,  however,  ironically  results  in  a  
confusing  translation,  since  the  double  bind  of  the  gift  requires  the  Shemites  both  to  translate  the  
divine  name  and  to  recognize  the  impossibility  of  translating  the  divine  name.  God  confuses  their  
language   in   such   a   manner   that   they   must   now   translate   inter-­‐‑lingually,   beginning   with   the  
divine  name.  Yet,  the  divine  name  preempts  translation,  first,  because  it  is  a  proper  name  and  not  
merely   a   common   noun   and,   second,   because   the   name   itself   “signifies   ambiguity   [and]  
confusion.”23  
Through   the   gift   of   the   divine   patriarchal   name,   God   confuses   the   Shemites’   singular  
language   into   a   plurivocity,   puts   a   halt   to   the   construction   of   the   tower   that   symbolizes   the  
arrogance   of   their   “colonial   violence”   and   “linguistic   imperialism,”   and   then   scatters   them  
abroad   into   fragmented   cultures   according   to   the   new   discursive   plurality.24   One   might   say,  
therefore,   that   the   patronymic   gift   of   the   sign   of   the   “father”   provokes   the   matronymic  
multiplicity  of  the  various  and  diverse  “mother  tongues.”  These  acts  of  divine  vengeance  center  
on   the   equivocation,   the   impossible   necessity,   and   the   retribution   that   require   culpable  human  
beings   to   translate   the   divine   name,   which,   again,   according   to   his   good   deconstructive  
apophaticism,  Derrida  disputes  can  ever  genuinely  be  translated.  Consequently,  he  testifies  that  
God  condemns  the  Shemites  to  the  Sisyphean  task  of  translating  the  untranslatable  without  ever  
achieving  the  transparency  or  univocity  of  a  singular  meaning,  or  the  security  of  a  pure  language,  
or  the  final  closure  of  the  absolute  knowledge  of  a  transcendental  signified.  
Now,  granted,  throughout  his  corpus,  Derrida  has  consistently  insisted  that  he  does  not  
wish   to   traffic   in   the   ideals   of   linguistic   purity.   Furthermore,   he   also   consistently   rejects   any  
interpretation  of   language  as  postlapsarian,  as  the  results  of  an  original  sin  that  corrupted  clear  
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and   distinct   ideas   and   disrupted   the   intimacy   of   signifier   and   signified.   In   point   of   fact,   he  
categorically   confesses   that,   in  his  work,  he  has   “never   incorporated   the   theme  of  prelapsarian  
writing   that   would   have   fallen,   through   I   know   not   what   original   sin,   into   the   debased   and  
degraded   field   of   history.”25   As   stated   above,   there   is   for   him   no   “trespass   of   the   sign,”   no  
nostalgia   for   a   lost   originary   unity   of   meaning,   nor   any   messianic   expectation   for   the   final  
assimilation   of   shattered   semiotics.   The   notion   that   “the   sign   is   always   a   sign   of   the   Fall”   is  
specifically   idiosyncratic   to   an   ontotheological   faith   in   the   totalization   of   meaning.   Indeed,  
Derrida   claims   conclusively   that,   in   the   Tower   of   Babel  myth,   linguistic   plurality   results   in   an  
irreconcilable  alterity  in  which  plurality  remains  “bottomless  and  is  not  lived  as  negativity,  with  
any  nostalgia  for  lost  unity.”26  He  simply  refuses  to  profess  any  potential  salvation  or  restoration  
after  Babel,  denying  that   the  promise   inherent   in  all   language  –  a  promise   that  might  well  be  a  
motivating   force   in   all   translation   –   ever   genuinely   reaches   an   eschatological   unity   of  
hermeneutical  reconciliation.  Although  one  cannot  open  one’s  mouth  to  speak  or  pick  up  one’s  
pen  to  write  without  inevitably  activating  the  performative  promise  that  energizes  every  speech  
act,   the   promised   language   “to   come”   never   “delivers   any  messianic   or   eschatological   content  
here.”27  
Nevertheless,   Derrida   does   write   explicitly   of   “the   promise   of   the   reconciliation   of  
tongues,”  actually  announcing   the  “messianic   character  of   translation.”  Although  remaining  an  
asymptotic   process   without   any   programmable   denouement,   the   performative   promise   of  
translation   offers   a   proleptic   glimpse   of   “the   coming   shape   of   a   possible   reconciliation   among  
languages.”28   Apparently,   therefore,   Derrida   does   consistently   play   the   “sin”   language   game,  
especially  with  reference  to  the  Babel  narrative,  and  connects  the  ambiguities  of  translation  with  
divine   wrath,   divine   judgment,   and  with   a   postlapsarian   context   that   never   quite   escapes   the  
notion   of   a   pure   language   as   either   an   Edenic   reality   now   lost   or   as   a   messianic   kingdom   of  
univocity   yet   to   come.   Geoffrey   Bennington   apparently   confirms   this   Derridean   predilection  
toward  interpreting  the  Babel  myth  as  a  narrative  of  divine  retribution.  In  addressing  Derrida’s  
dismissal  of   a  perfect   translation,  he  writes,   “In   this  mileu  of   relative   confusion,   the   result  of   a  
confused   translation   of   the   name   of   God,   we   are   condemned   [emphasis   mine]   not   to   total  
incomprehension,   but   to   a  work   of   translation  which  will   never   be   accomplished.”29   Likewise,  
Elisabeth  Loevlie  certainly  reads  Derrida  as  associating  translation  with  the  fall  of  language  and  
the   alienation   of   the   sacred   when   she   writes   that   “the   potential   of   translation   according   to  
Derrida  and  Benjamin  is  repeatedly  to  remind  us  of  the  fallen  nature  of  language  [emphasis  mine]  
and   thereby   [to]   inspire   us   to   discover   its   sacred   potential.”30   As   a   result   of   his   use   of  
postlapsarian   idioms,   Derrida’s   semantics   of   non-­‐‑totalization,   linguistic   plurivocity,   the  
asymptotic  nature  of  absolute  knowledge,  and   the  semiotic/semantic  play  of  dissemination  and  
différance   appear   to   betray   both   a   certain   nostalgia   for   a   lost   linguistic   purity   and   also   an  
eschatological  longing  for  plurality  to  be  subordinated  to  singularity  as  the  redemptive  sign  that  
the  Shemites’  sins  have  finally  been  forgiven.  
Translation  as  Negotiation  
Derrida   is   not   particularly   sanguine   about   the   semiotic   surplus   of   polysemy;  
nevertheless,   he   does   admit   that   it   “represents   progress   in   relationship   to   the   linearity   of…  
monothematic   writing   or   reading.”   That   admission   acknowledges,   to   a   point,   that   polysemy  
functionally   tracks   the   dynamics   of   dissemination   and   différance   as   critical   of   any   extant  
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homogeneous   and   univocal   meaning.   Notwithstanding   this   admission,   however,   he   also  
reproaches  those  who  emphasize  polysemy  for  their   functional  disingenuousness  whereby  they  
apparently   endorse   the   plurality   and   heterogeneity   of   language,   but   always   within   a   broader  
context   of   the   “unitary   resumption   of   meaning…   within   the   horizon   of…   a   teleological   and  
totalizing  dialectics  that  at  a  given  moment,  however  far  off,  must  permit  the  reassemblage  of  the  
totality  of  a  text  into  the  truth  of  its  meaning.”31  In  other  words,  Derrida  suspects  that  polysemy  
tends  to  disguise  an  eschatological  hope  that  the  sin  of  linguistic  fragmentation  will  one  day  end  
in   the   restoration   of   a   pure   semiotics.   Strangely   enough,   he   explicitly  mentions   Ricœur   in   the  
context  of  such  deceptive  polysemic  confusion.  Ricœur  represents,  for  Derrida,  one  of  those  who  
undoubtedly   interprets   translation   as   the   result   of   an   original   semantic   sin,   a   sin   that   can   be  
reconciled  eventually   in  a  process  similar   to  Hegel’s  dialectical  subsumption  of   the  negative  by  
which  absolute  meaning  may  be  achieved  and  the  play  of  signifiers  may  be  concluded  through  a  
via  negativa  that  dialectically  affirms  a  transcendental  signified.32  
I   believe,   on   the   contrary,   that   Ricœur   unequivocally   and   assiduously   avoids   the  
dissimulation   of   transparent   translation   and   the   ontotheological   myth   of   the   redemption   of  
dissemination.   Indeed,   I   contend   that   Ricœur   shares   with   Derrida   the   idea   that   final   unitive  
meaning  remains  always  “to  come”  as  a  hermeneutical  event  of  the  absolute  future,  as  restrained  
in   the   tension   of   the   tense   of   the   “will   have   been”   –   a   “will   have   been”   that   will   never   be.  
Furthermore,   I   also   contend   that   Ricœur   may   genuinely   have   a   more   “deconstructive”  
appreciation  for  linguistic  plurality  and  the  resulting  positive  necessity  for  translation  than  does  
Derrida.   He   not   only   agrees   with   Derrida   in   rejecting   any   theory   of   pure   language   as   either  
prelapsarian  or  eschatological  but  also  goes  even  farther  by  refusing  to  play  the  language  game  in  
which  translation  and  interpretation  are  debts  incurred  through  acts  of  linguistic  iniquity.33  
As  does  Derrida,  so,  too,  Ricœur  contextualizes  his  philosophy  of  translation  within  the  
milieu   of   paradox,   actually   of   three   paradoxes.   First,   following   Franz   Rosenzweig,   Ricœur  
declares  that  translation  requires  that  one  serve  two  masters  simultaneously,   the  foreign  author  
and  the  appropriating  reader.34  This  bipolar  accountability  of  attempting  to  “bring  the  reader  to  
the  author  [or]  the  author  to  the  reader”  establishes  what  Derrida  would  call  a  “negotiation”  out  
of   which   precipitates   an   appreciation   of   alterity   and   difference,   not   only   with   reference   to  
discourse,   but   also   with   reference   to   sociological   and   ethical   issues   of   compromise   and  
community.35  Derrida  notes  that  “negotiation”  etymologically  signifies  “un-­‐‑leisure”  or  “dis-­‐‑ease”  
(neg-­‐‑otium).   It   references,   therefore,   a   constant  movement   among   several  positions,   a   reciprocal  
shuttling  between  multiple  stations  without   the  stasis  of   inertia.  Negotiating  for  Derrida  means  
“no   thesis,   no   position,   no   theme,   no   station,   no   substance,   no   stability,   [and]   a   perpetual  
suspension”;   consequently,  negotiation   is   rather   autotelic.   It  does  not   aim  at   stilling   the   flux  of  
conflicting  interpretations  by  achieving  the  equilibrium  of  a  definitive  and  final  meaning;  on  the  
contrary,   the   purpose   of   negotiation   is   to   ensure   the   continuation   of   the   asymptotic   mobility.  
Consequently,   genuine   negotiation   only   engages   “the   nonnegotiable   in   negotiation.”36   Perhaps  
one   could   identify   Derrida’s   interpretation   of   the   shuttling   to   and   fro   of   negotiation   with  
Ricœur’s   more   poetic   image   that   “throughout   the   world   sentences   flutter   between   men   like  
elusive  butterflies.”37  
One  may   certainly   transfer  Derrida’s   notion   of   negotiable   “shuttling”   to   Ricœur’s   first  
paradox   of   the   double   responsibility   translation   maintains   to   both   author   and   reader.   This  
responsibility  discloses   that   the  paradigm  of   translation   cannot   escape   the  obligation  of   justice.  
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Ricœur   testifies   that   “[t]o   translate   is   to  do   justice   to   a   foreign   intelligence”   and   to   admit  with  
humility  that  “[y]our  language  is  as  good  as  mine.”  Such  is,  for  him,  “the  formula  for  recognized  
diversity.”38  He  insists  that  the  translator  can  never  escape  the  tension  of  this  bifurcated  loyalty  to  
the  different  and  to  the  same,  certainly  not  by  pretending  that  some  pure,  transparent  translation  
could  be  realized,  which  would  adequately  transfer  objective  meaning  from  one  language  system  
into  another.  In  point  of  fact,  this  restriction  indicates  the  second  of  Ricœur’s  paradoxes,  namely,  
that   “a   good   translation   can   aim   only   at   a   supposed   equivalence   that   is   not   founded   on   a  
demonstrable   identity  of  meaning.  An  equivalence  without   identity.”39  To  be   sure,  he  does  not  
consider  this  “non-­‐‑identical”  equivalence  that  translation  hopes  to  achieve  to  be  a  cypher  for  any  
presumed   “objective”   transliteration   of   an   ideal   signified.   As   Richard   Kearney   expresses   it,  
Ricœur  attests  to  the  necessity  of  the  translator’s  renunciation  of  any  “dream  of  a  return  to  some  
adamantine   logos   of   pure   correspondences.”40   Such   a   theory,   Ricœur   insists,   would,   indeed,  
require   the   “purity”   of   a   “third   text,”   something   of   a   meta-­‐‑text   that   would   exist   beyond   the  
boundaries  of   the  original   and   the   target   language.  Without   such  a  meta-­‐‑textual   criterion,  how  
could  one  possibly  calibrate  whether  a  translation  was  adequate  or  valid?  
Here   again,   in   the   second   paradox,   Ricœur   clearly   denies   that   any   univocal   meaning  
exists   that   can   “save”   the   pure   quality   of   the   signified   from   the   impure   fragmentation   of   the  
various  signifiers.  At  this  point,  he  adopts  a  strategy  similar  to  his  reading  of  metaphor,  which  in  
itself  is  another  variant  of  translation,  given  that  meta-­‐‑pherein  functions  according  to  the  efficacy  
of  discursive  transference,  carrying  linguistic  sense  across  from  one  semantic  field  to  another.  He  
explains  metaphor  as   a   “semantic   impertinence”  or   “semantic   innovation”   that   actually   creates  
new  meaning.41  Likewise,  he  argues  that  translational  equivalence  is  not  so  much  discovered  as  
created,   the   equivalence   being   a   goal   of   the   translating   process   itself.   Equivalence   is   not   a  
presupposition,  therefore,  but  a  production  or  invention,  what  Ricœur  calls  the  “constructing  of  
comparables.”42  This  invention  of  correspondence  discloses  the  “grandeur  of  translation  [and  the]  
risk   of   translation:   creative   betrayal   of   the   original,   equally   creative   appropriation   by   the  
reception   language.”43  At   this  specific  point,  Ricœur’s  philosophy  of   translation  syncs  yet  again  
with  Derrida’s,  since  the  latter  also  argues  that  translation  transforms  both  the  source  language  as  
well  as   the  target   language.  Translation,   therefore,  promises  “a  regulated  transformation  of  one  
language  by  another,  of  one  text  by  another.”44  
The  above  notion  of  “betrayal”  connects  directly  with  Ricœur’s  third  paradox,  a  paradox  
that  he  concludes  operates  as  both  the  terminus  a  quo  and  terminus  ad  quem  of  translation,  as  well  
as   being   a   paradox   shared   directly   with   Derrida.   That   paradox   is   the   tension   between   the  
translatable   and   the   untranslatable.45   Ricœur  professes   that   there   simply   is   translation,   il   y   a   la  
traduction.46  He   argues   that   “translation  belongs   to   the  history   of   reading”;47   therefore,   in   some  
manner,  all  texts  demand  translation  and  re-­‐‑translation,  because  all  texts  open  themselves  “to  an  
unlimited  series  of  readings.”48  Yet,   in   the  midst  of   this  proclivity   to   translation,   there   lurks  the  
specter  of  the  untranslatable.  Discourse  is  haunted  by  this  specter  in  two  forms.  First,  there  is  the  
initial   untranslatability   of   the   plurality   of   languages,   the   threat   that   linguistic   diversity   might  
indicate   a   heterogeneity   so   fundamental   to   discourse   that   translation   is   prohibited   a   priori.49  
Second,  there  is  the  phantom  of  the  secret  or  of  the  mystery  forever  possessing  the  body  of  any  
text,  the  “most  entrenched  incommunicable”  that  cannot  be  repeated.50  With  the  untranslatability  
of   the   secret,   Ricœur   transfers   alterity   from   the   heteronomous   Other   beyond   the   self   to   the  
autonomous  Other  that  indicates  a  fundamental  strangeness  inherent  within  the  self  –  oneself  as  
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another.   This   tension   between   the   “inexorable   plurality”   of   the   foreign   and   the   “impenetrable  
solitude”   of   the   self-­‐‑same   results   in   translation   as   the   “remedy   for   plurality   in   a   world   of  
dispersion   and   confusion.”51   Still,   the   therapeutic   quality   of   translation   does   not   lead   to  
singularity  or  transcendental  closure,  since  translation  itself  cannot  escape  a  systemic  pluralism.  
There  is  one  human  race  only  because  comparables  of  meaning  may  be  invented,  homeomorphic  
connections   may   transfer   among   the   plurality   of   discourses,   and   negotiations   may   continue  
among   the   incommensurable   language  games.52  Yet,   again,   a   beneficial   aspect   of   translation   as  
making  the  “incomparable  comparable”  is  that  it  allows  individuals  to  understand  a  world  other  
than   their   own   and   to   accede   to   the   reality   that   one’s   language   is   simply   “one   among  many.”  
Doing  so  empowers  compromise,  which,  in  turn,  may  lead  ethically  to  the  “common  good.”53  
Although   the   third   paradox   figures   significantly   in   Ricœur’s   work,   he   confesses   a  
dissatisfaction  with  it  and  a  desire  to  move  beyond  it  to  a  different  polarity  of  concepts.  Instead  of  
the   translatable   and   untranslatable,   which   he   finds   too   speculative,   he   wishes   to   speak   of  
faithfulness   and   betrayal.   Does   the   translator   remain   faithful   to   the   original   text   or   become   a  
traitor,  betraying  the  original  text  through  the  arrogance  of  reiteration?  In  turn,  is  the  arrogance  
of  translational  reiteration  exacerbated  by  the  reiteration  of  reiteration,  that  is,  by  the  inevitability  
that   no   translation   is   apodictically   a   singular   and   unique   attempt   to   transfer   meaning   from  
discourse  to  discourse?  In  other  words  –  always,  en  d’autres  mots!  –  Ricœur  identifies  the  desire  to  
translate  as  most  conspicuously  revealed  in  the  possibility  of  retranslating,  in  the  recognition  that  
the   surplus   of   meaning   presumed   to   be   in   any   text   requires   the   undetermined   repetition   of  
plausible  translations.54  In  this  sense,  the  “betrayal”  of  translation  that  ensues  from  the  failure  to  
convert  meaning  from  one  language  to  another  without  remainder  actually  constitutes  a  certain  
fidelity   to   the   original   through   a   re-­‐‑commitment   to   the   “indefatigable   work   of   translation”  
whereby   alterity   and   difference   are   celebrated   through   the   diversity   of   the   pluralism   of  
paraphrase.55  Here  again,  one  may  well  reconfirm  the  peut-­‐‑être  innate  in  the  translation  process  –  
the  translator  is  “perhaps”  a  traitor;  the  betrayal  is  “perhaps”  not  so  treasonous.  
Ricœur’s  replacement  polarity  of  faithfulness  and  betrayal  strengthens  his  connection  to  
Derrida,  who   agrees   that   translation   implies   “an   oath   of   fidelity   to   a   given   original,”   albeit   an  
oath  vulnerable   to  “treason  or  perjury,”   that   is,   to   the  potentiality  of  betrayal.56  But   for  Ricœur,  
this  polarity  better  expresses  the  absence  of  the  pure  “third”  text  referenced  above  as  a  guarantor  
of   univocal   meaning   and   also   better   accounts   for   the   first   paradox   of   correlating   author   and  
reader.   Consequently,   it   enables   him   to   engage   the   ethos   of   translation   by   proposing   the  
somewhat   “redemptive”   dynamic   of   “linguistic   hospitality.”57   With   this   phrase,   Ricœur  
summarizes   the   ethical   dynamics   that   emanate   from   translation   as   a   paradigm   for   mutual  
recognition,   for   cultural   rapprochement,   and   for   the   promise   of   a   communicable   common  good.  
Kearney  terms  this  socio-­‐‑ethical  application  of  translation  the  “ontological  paradigm”  and  sets  it  
over  against  the  “linguistic  paradigm”  that  emphasizes  both  inter-­‐‑  and  intra-­‐‑lingual  translation.58  
Linguistic  hospitality,  however,  should  not  be  interpreted,  that  is,  translated,  into  a  different  type  
of   grace   than   the   ethical   graciousness   that   eventuates   in   the   taking   of   “responsibility,   in  
imagination  and  in  sympathy,  for  the  story  of  the  other,  through  the  life  narratives  which  concern  
that  other.”59  The  grace  of  linguistic  hospitality  offers  no  “redemption”  of  translation  that  would  
repudiate,   in   any   way,   the   impossibility   of   an   anamnesis   recovering   a   prelapsarian   linguistic  
purity,  “the   idea  of  a  haunting  of   the  past,”60  or  of  an  eschatological  aspiration   for  a   reconciled  
reunification  of  discourse.  For  Ricœur,  the  “translator’s  task”  requires  a  “work  of  mourning,”  the  
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“sober”   forsaking  of   “the   ideal   of   the  perfect   translation.”61   In  doing   so,   the   translator   can   live  
contentedly  with  the  “agreed  deficiency”  of  never  resolving  the  first  paradox  –  that  is,  adequately  
serving   the   two   masters   of   author   and   reader.62   Once   a   translator   accedes   to   the   “impassible  
difference   of   the   peculiar   and   the   foreign,”   s/he   progresses   through   an   entelechy   marked   by  
polysemy,  ambiguity,  and  plurivocity  toward  a  happiness  of  translation,  specifically,  a  linguistic  
happiness  directly  affiliated  with  linguistic  hospitality.63  
Pace   Derrida,   Ricœur’s   emphases   on   polysemy,   ambiguity,   and   plurivocity   are   not  
specimens  of  a  dialectics  of  totalization,  nor  is  his  emphasis  on  linguistic  hospitality  a  summons  
to   univocity   or   homogeneity.   On   the   contrary,   he   interprets   translation   in   ways   remarkably  
similar  to  Derrida’s  notions  of  dissemination,  différance,  and  the  non-­‐‑closure  of  the  non-­‐‑originary  
trace.  Yet,  going  even  further,  he  refuses   to   translate   translation   into  the  punitive  symbolism  of  
transgression,   retribution,   and   reconciliation,   a   translation   that   Derrida,   himself,   occasionally  
incorporates   into  his  philosophy.  Ricœur  may  claim  that   there   is  no   innocent   translation,   in   the  
sense   of   one   exempt   from   the   risks   of   hermeneutics;   however,   he   does   not   claim   that  
interpretation   or   translation   is   ever   guilty   of   a   postlapsarian   alienation   from   the   singularity   of  
meaning.  
The  remarkable  distinction  between  Ricœur  and  Derrida  may  be  clearly  noted  in  the  two  
thinkers’  conclusively  contrary  readings  of  the  Tower  of  Babel  myth.  Whereas  Derrida  continues  
to  rely  on  the  retaliatory  language  of  divine  judgment  when  deciphering  the  Babel  myth,  Ricœur  
rejects  any   interpretation  of   the  narrative  as   revealing  a  catastrophe  of   language  resulting   from  
divine  wrath  and  retribution.  Of  course,  he  does  admit  that  the  narrative  may  give  some  indirect  
textual  evidence  for  the  validity  of  such  an  interpretation.  He  considers  the  myth  to  be  “too  short  
and   too   confused   in   its   literary   construction”   and,   thereby,   to   be   vulnerable   to   a   reading   that  
infers   its   support   of   a   “regressive   movement”   signaling   “an   irremediable   linguistic  
catastrophe.”64  He  insists,  however,  that  a  more  critical  and  close  reading  of  the  text  will  disclose  
that  the  myth  prosecutes  the  diversifying  of  discourses  as  an  innocent,  and  even  gracious,  act  of  
divine  heterophilia  revealing  God’s  celebration  of  cosmic  extravagance.  Following  Umberto  Eco,  
he   demonstrates   how   the   Babel   myth   simply   continues   a   de   facto   acceptance   of   linguistic  
diversity,   which   in   itself   is   one   example   of   several   that   identify   heterogeneity   as   a   factical  
characteristic   of   creation.   The   separation   of   cosmos   from   chaos   in   the   first   creation   story,   the  
Adamic  myth  of  the  fall  as  an  etiology  of  humanity’s  moral  maturation,  and  even  the  fratricide  of  
Abel  as  an  indicator  of  the  necessity  to  develop  the  “ethical  project”  of  concern  for  the  other  attest  
to   originary   plurality,   difference,   and   mutability   as   traits   of   reality   characterized   by   an  
“innocence  of  becoming.”65  
From   the   perspective   of   Ricœur’s   non-­‐‑penal   reading   of   the   Babel   myth,   one   might  
interpret   God’s   response   to   the   homogeneity   of   human   language   and   culture   as   a   necessary  
corrective  to  an  unintended  situation  created  by  God  Godself.  Obviously  the  Babel  story  connects  
directly  with   the   Flood   story,   a   tale   that  does   appear   to  narrate  God’s   judgment  upon   a   sinful  
humanity.   Perhaps,   therefore,   the  punitive   character   of   that  myth   gets   transferred   contextually  
over   to   the   Babel   legend   and   that   explains   the   propensity   to   interpret   the   latter   as   divine  
retribution.   Ironically,   however,   in   the   Flood   chronicle,   the   text   states   quite   clearly   that   the  
disobedient  decadence  and  violence  of  humanity  does  not  evoke  in  God  attitudes  of  wrath  and  
vengeance  but  deep  feelings  of   regret  and  anguish:  “And  the  Lord  was  sorry   that  he  had  made  
humankind  on  the  earth,  and  it  grieved  him  to  his  heart”  (Gen.  6:6  NRSV,  emphasis  added).  God’s  
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“blotting  out”  of   sinful  humanity,   consequently,   is  not  overtly  an  act  of  anger  but  of  wounded  
disappointment.   Yet,   God’s   grief   does   not   blind   God   to   the   necessity   for   grace.   Since   Noah  
establishes   himself   as   one   who   remains   committed   to   God’s   original   intent   for   creation,   God  
spares  him  and  his  family  from  destruction.  Yet,  in  that  act  of  grace,  God  actually  creates  a  set  of  
circumstances   that   undermines   the   divine   heterophilia   that  God  displays   in   the   original   act   of  
creation.   In   saving   only   one   family,   God   saves   only   one   culture   and   one   language,   thereby  
intentionally   or   unintentionally   diminishing   alterity,   difference,   and   plurality.   For   that   reason,  
perhaps,  God  instructs  Noah  and  his  family  to  rectify  the  collateral  damage  of  the  Flood  and  re-­‐‑
establish  the  plurality  of  multiculturalism  (Gen.  9:1).  
The   Babel   saga,   then,   recounts   how  God’s   instructions   to   diversify  were   not   followed.  
The   descendants   of   Noah   do   not   “fill   the   earth”   but   remain   in   one   place,   with   one   language,  
constructing   one   culture.   A   passive   response   from   God   would   only   result   in   a   status   quo   of  
monotonous  uniformity;  accordingly,  God  intervenes  to  force  the  issue,  to  create  the  necessity  for  
heterogeneity   by   “confusing”   language   in   order   to   impede   communicability,   so   as   to   compel  
humanity   to   return   to   the   pluralism   and   diversity   initially   intended   by   creation.   Indeed,   one  
could  engage  in  some  intertextuality  between  the  Hebrew  and  Christian  scriptures  and  note  how  
the   account   of   Pentecost   in   Acts   2   augments   the   significance   of   the   Babel   story  with   a   public  
proclamation  of  divine  redemption  through  the  miracle  of  translation.  According  to  the  pericope,  
every   culture   present   hears   the   message   of   divine   grace   translated   into   its   own   idiom.   This  
“realized  eschatology”  of  the  Gospel  message  celebrates  the  task  of  translation  as  the  creation  of  
comparables   among   linguistically   diverse   and   socially   distinct   communities.   As   a   result,  
Pentecost  is  not  the  “redemption”  of  Babel,  because,  following  Ricœur’s  reading,  Babel  does  not  
need   redeeming.   Instead,  Pentecost   is   the  Christian   re-­‐‑affirmation  of   the  Hebrew  celebration  of  
God’s  desire  for  variation  and  nonconformity.66  
I  contend  that  the  above  reading  correlates  consistently  with  Ricœur’s  contention  that  the  
proliferation  of  languages  and,  therefore,  the  necessity  for  translation,  are  the  way  things  ought  
to   be.  He   stresses   that   the   diversification   of   language   in   Babel   introduces   no   condemnation   of  
humanity;   instead,   it   illustrates   that   the  profusion  of  discourses   is   just   the  way   things  are  –  no  
fault,   no   foul.67   As   a   result,   Ricœur   demands   that   the   myth   be   read   as   manifesting   “no  
recrimination,   no   lamentation,   no   accusation.”68   Language   only   exists,   consequently,   in  
languages,   realizing   any   “universal   [linguistic]   potentialities   only   in   systems   differentiated   on  
phonological,  lexical,  syntactic  and  stylistic  levels.”  This  means  that  “translation  is  de  facto  [while]  
translatability   is   de   jure.”69   Furthermore,   it   also   means   that   the   Babel   motif   can   never   be  
eradicated,  that  confusion,  risk,  and  diversity  will  always  mark  every  event  of  discourse,  and  that  
language  does  not  need  redeeming,  since  it  is  not  in  itself  transgressive.  
Ricœur  and  a  “Derridean”  Conclusion  
Although  deconstruction  maintains  a  consistent  suspicion  toward  polarities,  always  wary  
of  any  implicit  metaphysics  that  might  be  empowering  them,  Derrida,  nonetheless,  finds  certain  
binaries  to  be  rhetorically  beneficial.  Among  those  beneficial  pairs  are  two  that  bear  directly  on  
this  essay.  First,  he  distinguishes  between,  on  the  one  hand,  “the  saddened,  negative,  nostalgic,  
guilty,   Rousseauistic   side”   of   mourning   for   the   lost   presence   of   an   absent   origin   of   precise  
meaning   and,   on   the   other,   the  Nietzschean   alternative   of   the   “affirmation   of   a  world   of   signs  
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without  fault,  without  truth  and  without  origin  which  is  offered  to  an  active  interpretation.”  This  
distinction   leads   naturally   to   a   second,   the   distinction   between   two   interpretations   of  
interpretation.  The  first  “dreams  of  deciphering  a  truth  or  an  origin  which  escapes  play  and  the  
order   of   the   sign,”   and   the   second   “affirms  play…   [and   rejects   dreaming]   of   full   presence,   the  
reassuring  foundation,  the  origin  and  the  end  of  play.”70  Derrida  labels  the  first  interpretation  of  
interpretation,   the   “rabbinic,”   and   the   second,   the   “poetic.”71   Now,   according   to   Steiner,  
translation   and   interpretation   may   well   be   synonyms,   since   both   concern   the   transference   of  
meaning   in   order   to   realize   communication.   For   him,   a   translator   is   an   interpreter.72   Indeed,  
Ricœur  himself  would  agree  and  would  also  overtly  connect  translation  and  interpretation.73  This  
synonymy,   therefore,   warrants   translating   the   Derridean   taxonomy   of   interpretation   into   a  
taxonomy   of   translation.   From   the   rabbinical   perspective,   translation   pursues   the   recovery   of  
some  originary  unitive  meaning  or  “dreams”  of  some  eschatological  essence  of  linguistic  purity.  
From  the  poetic  perspective,  difference  and  plurality  are  celebrated,  and  translation  remains  the  
unending  play  of  kinetic  meaning.  
Given  his  original  indictment  of  Ricœur’s  alleged  polysemy  as  a  dialectics  of  totalization,  
Derrida  would  position  Ricœur’s  philosophy  of   translation  as  rabbinic  and  not  poetic.  For  him,  
Ricœur  betrays  both  a  Rousseauistic  mourning  for  a   lost  Edenic  Esperanto  and  a  prophetic  and  
rabbinic  optimism  for  a  messianic  advent  of  precise  meaning.  Yet,  I  have  tried  to  argue  through  
this   essay   that   Ricœur   rightly   exemplifies   the   second   distinction,   that   he   supports   the   poetic  
dynamic   of   translation,   adopting   a   Nietzschean   affirmation   of   plurality,   difference,   and  
uncertainty  with  reference  to  the  semiotic  and  semantic  play  of  meaning.  Ricœur  is  on  record  in  
numbers   of   texts   overtly   consenting   to   the   salutary   implications   of   hermeneutical   pluralism,  
diversity,  and  indeterminacy.  For  example,  if  one  considers  that  ontology  may  well  offer  an  end  
to  signification,   that  by  finally  connecting  with  Being  as  the   legislating  referent  for  determining  
the  adequation  of  language  one  can  embrace  the  definite  article  and  confirm  “the”  interpretation,  
“the”  truth,  or  “the”  meaning,  then  Ricœur’s  position  categorically  denies  the  possibility  of  that  
embrace.  He  claims   that  although  “ontology   is   indeed   the  promised   land   for  a  philosophy   that  
begins  with  language,”  we  are  all  “Moses”  fated  only  to  “glimpse  this  land  before  dying.”74  Or,  
consider  his  reflections  on  interpretation  and  testimony,  where  he  confesses  that  technical  proofs  
of   certainty   are   replaced   with   the   more   inexact   confirmation   of   attestation.   He   concludes   his  
investigation   into   testimony  with   the   judgment   that   one  must   “choose   between   philosophy   of  
absolute   knowledge   and   the   hermeneutics   of   testimony.”75   He   reiterates   a   similar   sentiment  
utilizing  the  concept  of  “mourning,”  which  figures  so  significantly  in  his  theory  of  translation.  He  
writes   that   “philosophy   mourns   the   loss   of   absolute   knowledge”   and   must   accept   the  
irrevocability   of   the   conflict   of   interpretations.   Once   again,   he   summarizes   in   a   conclusion:  
“Between  absolute  knowledge  and  hermeneutics,   it   is  necessary   to  choose.”76  Ricœur  has  made  
his  choice  –  there  is  no  access  to  absolute  knowledge,  which  leaves  no  alternative  other  than  the  
risk   of   hermeneutics.   On   the   basis   of   his   more   poetic,   Nietzschean   approach   to   language,  
therefore,  he  issues  the  following  command:  “give  up  the  ideal  of  the  perfect  translation.”77  
I  must  repeat  that  a  careful  reading  of  Ricœur’s  paradigm  of  translation  indicates  that  he  
neither  longs  for  a  return  to  a  discursive  Eden  nor  does  he  prophesy  the  coming  of  some  semantic  
messiah  who  will  resolve  the  equivocity  of  fallen  meaning  in  a  miraculous  restoration  of  absolved  
and   absolute   univocity.78   Translation   cannot   immunize   itself   against   the   infections   of   risk,   of  
fragmentation,  of  plurality,  of  iteration,  or  of  impossibility.  For  Ricœur,  as  for  Derrida,  then,  the  
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translator  must  always  be  something  of  a  traitor  but  never  one  who  should  be  condemned  as  a  
sinner.  Translation  negotiates  the  distance  between  faithfulness  and  betrayal,   the  untranslatable  
and   the   translatable,   the   foreign  and   the   familiar,   the   secret   and   the   revealed,   and   the   stranger  
and   the   friend.   Translation   remains   the   innocent   task   of   affirming   fidelity   to   the   necessity   of  
finding  “other  words,”  while  recognizing  that  finding  those  words  always  results  in  loss.  Such  a  
loss  of  meaning  always  ends  in  betrayal  –  well,  “perhaps.”  
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